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Abstract
We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in
competitive insurance markets. In the previous literature, it has been shown
that, with perfect insurance markets, social insurance improves welfare since it
is able to redistribute without creating distortions. This result has been taken
as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide
additional justifications for social insurance. We show, however, that adverse
selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with
perfect markets. Whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance,
it also causes welfare-reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply
and hence tax revenue. In addition, adverse selection may reduce the redis-
tributive potential of social insurance. We illustrate our general results using
different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market. Notably, we derive
conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal
and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive
objectives.
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Introduction 1
1 Introduction
It is known since Mirrlees (1971) that the problem of taxation is fundamentally linked
to asymmetric information between the government and workers. Only with the as-
sumption that the government cannot observe individual productivities does the need
for distorting income taxation arise. The contributions of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) and Wilson (1977) have shown that a similar issue makes the problem of equi-
librium in competitive insurance markets a relevant question. If insurance companies
cannot observe risk types, the resulting market allocation will not in general be ef-
ficient. With this article, we aim at providing a theory that ties together these two
branches of information economics and at highlighting previously ignored interactions
between distorting taxation, social insurance and imperfect insurance markets.
Our starting point are the existing models of taxation and social insurance, such
as Rochet (1991), Cremer and Pestieau (1996) and Henriet and Rochet (2004). Using
the assumption of perfect insurance markets, this literature has concluded that social
insurance can be a useful instrument for redistribution as it evens out differences in
private insurance premiums without causing distortions. This result has been taken as
robust to the introduction of adverse selection, which would only constitute an addi-
tional justification for social insurance. Indeed, Wilson (1977) and Eckstein, Eichen-
baum, and Peled (1985) have shown that the government might be able to Pareto
improve upon the market allocation by introducing social insurance in an insurance
market with adverse selection. The simple intuition that equity and efficiency effects
complement one another as motivations for social insurance has therefore prevailed.
In this paper, we demonstrate that this reasoning is invalid. It ignores interde-
pendencies that emerge when the models of taxation and of insurance markets are
combined thoroughly. The link between the two strands is a theory of precautionary
labor that we develop in section 2. We show that, under a broad range of reasonable
assumptions, greater uncertainty leads individuals to increase their labor supply. In
section 3, we use this result to demonstrate that adverse selection can weaken the
case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets. Social insur-
ance might indeed work against the inefficiency of underinsurance. At the same time,
however, individuals faced with less uncertainty will reduce labor supply, and hence
tax revenues will decline. This negatively affects social welfare. Furthermore, with
adverse selection it is no longer clear whether social insurance can redistribute income
at all, as private premiums do not necessarily correspond to individual risks any more.
In section 4, we illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts
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for the insurance markets. Several insights can be drawn from these illustrations. So-
cial insurance will alleviate the inefficiency of underinsurance in the Rothschild-Stiglitz
framework but has negative effects in the labor market by reducing precautionary
labor supply. This endorses the case for only partial social insurance or even for com-
plete renunciation. If the equilibrium is of the Wilson pooling type, social insurance
additionally looses its main potential for redistribution. In case of a Miyazaki-Wilson
equilibrium, no positive efficiency effects of social insurance remain, while it still en-
tails labor supply distortions and suffers from reduced redistributive power. In sum,
we conclude that the case for social insurance is weakened by the presence of adverse
selection in insurance markets irrespective of the equilibrium concept considered.
The most similar existing work is the contribution by Boadway, Leite-Monteiro,
Marchand, and Pestieau (2006) who were the first to examine optimal taxation
with adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard in insurance markets.1 Based on
Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibria they find the case for social insurance strength-
ened by market inefficiencies. However, while labor supply is chosen under uncertainty
in our model, their results are based on the assumption that labor supply decisions
take place after a possible damage has been realized. This reduces the impact of un-
derinsurance on individual decisions to income effects. We do not want to eliminate
the precautionary effects resulting from labor supply under uncertainty which play a
crucial role in understanding the interaction between taxation and insurance.
2 Labor Supply under Uncertainty
In this section, we derive important results on labor supply under uncertainty that
will be used in our model of taxation and social insurance. Making use of the insights
of Kimball (1990), we establish a theory of ‘precautionary labor’. While the theory
of precautionary savings has received some attention,2 the problem of labor supply
under uncertainty is less explored. Eaton and Rosen (1979) and (1980), Hartwick
(2000), Parker, Belghitar, and Barmby (2005) and Floden (2006) consider the case of
endogenous labor with wage uncertainty. We do not model wage risk but an income
independent risk to consumption. Labor supply is chosen before the risk is realized.
This gives rise to the question whether risk induces people to work more or less than
they would in case of certainty.3
1We refrain from analyzing moral hazard in this article.
2See Sandmo (1970), Abel (1988), and Kimball (1990).
3Similar effects appear in Stiglitz (1982). However, this contribution lacks the theoretical tools
developed by Kimball (1990), which will allow for a very clear analysis of labor supply under uncer-
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We restrict our attention to Bernoulli random variables that result from a possible
damage D which occurs with probability p. Let θ(β) denote such a random variable,
where β ∈ [0, 1] stands for the share of the damage that is insured. It can be used to
vary both expected value E[θ(β)] = p (1−β)D and variance Var[θ(β)] = p (1−p)[(1−
β)D]2 of the risk. Furthermore, as throughout the paper, an additively separable
utility function U(c, L) = u(c)+v(L) is assumed, where c denotes consumption and L
denotes labor supply.4 Denote the productivity of an individual by w. Firms observe
w and pay wages according to marginal productivity such that earned income is wL.
The individual receives an additional, exogenous and state independent income T .
The first order condition for labor supply L∗ that maximizes expected utility in
the presence of a given consumption risk θ(β0) is
wE [u′ (wL∗ + T − θ(β0))] = −v′(L∗), (1)
where E is the expectations operator.5 To answer the question how risk affects labor
supply, we examine the move from θ(β0) to the risk θ(β)+(β−β0)pD, which constitutes
a change in variance, leaving the expected value unaffected. We define the equivalent
precautionary premium Ψ(β0, β) for such a move implicitly as follows:
E [u′ (wL∗ + T − θ(β0)−Ψ(β0, β))] = E [u′ (wL∗ + T − θ(β)− (β − β0)pD)] . (2)
It has the following interpretation: The compensated change in insurance will have
the same effect on the LHS of (1) and therefore on optimal labor supply as a lump-
sum reduction of income by Ψ(β0, β). Both affect the optimality condition in the same
way. Therefore, statements about the effect of risk on labor supply can be restated
as income effects triggered by a decrease of income by Ψ.
Implicit differentiation of (2) yields a formulation for ∂Ψ(β0, β)/∂β. Most relevant
is the evaluation of this derivative at β = β0, which gives the income change that
has the same effect on labor supply as a small change in insurance, starting from a
situation with insurance β0. We obtain
∂Ψ(β0, β)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=β0
=
(
−∆u
′′(.)/(1− β0)D
E[u′′(.)]
)(
1
2
∂Var
∂β
)
, (3)
tainty in the following.
4We assume the function v to be at least twice and u at least three times differentiable. In
addition, the standard conditions u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0, v′(L) < 0 and v′′(L) < 0 are assumed to
hold.
5The sufficient second order condition for a maximum is satisfied.
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where ∆u′′(.) is the difference of u′′(.) between consumption levels in case of no damage
and damage, and E[u′′(.)] is the expected value of u′′(.).
The first term in brackets on the RHS of (3) is the generalized coefficient of absolute
prudence ηG(β0). As β0 converges to 1, i.e. the examined situation converges to
a situation without risk, the coefficient ηG converges to the prudence η as defined
by Kimball (1990), which is simply the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the
function u′(.), i.e. η = −u′′′/u′′. From (3) follow first implications for labor supply
under uncertainty, which are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A marginal increase in insurance coverage from β0, which is compen-
sated by an actuarially fair premium adjustment, decreases labor supply if and only if
ηG(β0) > 0.
Proof. By (3) and ∂Var/∂β < 0, the compensated increase in insurance has the same
effect as an increase in income if and only if ηG(β0) > 0. Next, with separable
preferences, leisure is a normal good. Hence an increase in income decreases labor
supply.
Conversely, a higher labor supply will be the reaction to less insurance iff ηG > 0;
the individual has a motive for precautionary labor. The size of ηG indicates how
strong this motive is. A sufficient condition for ηG(β0) to be positive is that u′′′(.)
is positive in the relevant range of consumption levels. This in turn is a necessary
condition for constant or decreasing risk aversion, both in absolute and relative terms.6
Therefore, under the common and realistic assumption of non-increasing risk aversion,
precautionary labor effects do exist.
The results so far were derived for changes in risk that leave the expected damage
unaffected. If this is not the case, changes in risk entail additional income effects.
It is still useful to distinguish between pure risk effects via the variance and income
effects via expected values.
Lemma 2. The total effect of a marginal increase in β on labor supply can be expressed
as
∂L∗
∂β
=
∂L∗
∂T
[
pD − ∂Ψ
∂β
]
, (4)
where ∂L∗/∂T < 0 is the negative income effect and ∂Ψ/∂β stands short for the
expression (3).7
6See Appendix A in Netzer and Scheuer (2005), an earlier version of this paper, for a proof.
7Throughout the rest of the paper, we stick to this convention, i.e. we write ∂Ψ/∂β for the
expression (3).
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Proof. In the appendix.
First, higher coverage increases expected income by pD. This effect would vanish
if an insurance premium were adjusted actuarially fairly. Second, the change in the
variance has the same effect as a decrease of income by the premium Ψ that is raised
by an increased insurance coverage β. As shown above, this premium will in general
be negative.
3 Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance
3.1 The Model
This section derives conditions for optimal government policy in the presence of ad-
verse selection in insurance markets. This is done without an explicit model of such
market imperfections. We demonstrate in section 4 that different equilibrium concepts
can easily be incorporated.
Our model setup is similar to Cremer and Pestieau (1996) and Boadway, Leite-
Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau (2006). We consider a society that consists of N
individuals described by two characteristics: their productivity and their probability
of incurring a damage of size D. There are W different productivity levels wi, i =
1, ...,W and two damage probabilities pj, j = L,H, with pL < pH . In what follows,
the index i will always refer to productivity while j refers to damage probability.
We denote the proportion of individuals in the population that have productivity wi
and damage probability pj by nij. The population average of the risk probability
is p¯ =
∑
i,j nijpj. The average risk within productivity group i is p¯i = (1/(niL +
niH))
∑
j nijpj.
As commonly assumed in the theory of optimal taxation, the government maxi-
mizes the utilitarian objective. It can neither observe individual productivities nor
damage probabilities but only knows the joint distribution of both characteristics.
Hours worked are unobservable as well, so that taxes have to be conditioned on ob-
servable labor income and will be distorting. The tax schedule is restricted to a
constant marginal tax rate τ and a lump-sum transfer T . In addition, the government
can force the citizens to insure a share α of the possible damage. Such social insur-
ance is financed by a uniform contribution p¯ αD by each individual. The remaining
risk can be insured privately. The contract that individual ij purchases is denoted by
Iij = (βij, dij), where βij is the privately insured share of the damage and dij is the
premium.
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The time structure is as follows. First, the government sets its policy P = (τ, T, α).
Taking P as given, individuals simultaneously choose their labor supply and purchase
their insurance contract Iij. They also pay taxes and social insurance contributions
and receive the transfer. Finally, the damage occurs according to the given probabil-
ities. After payments of social and private insurance, consumption takes place.
3.2 Optimal Government Policy
The timing of our model is such that individuals simultaneously choose their labor
supply and a private insurance contract. For the sake of exposition, however, suppose
for the moment that an individual’s choice of insurance Iij is fixed exogenously. Then
optimal labor supply L∗ij(τ, T, α, βij, dij) can be determined. It is implicitly defined
by a standard first order condition that can be differentiated to obtain comparative
static effects as shown in the proof of Lemma 2. In our notation, the derivative of L∗ij
with respect to α already includes the effect of the increase in the social insurance
contribution p¯ αD. By contrast, the derivative with respect to βij does not take into
account a change in the premium. Where needed, the effect that accounts for such a
change is marked with the letter A:8
∂L∗ij
∂βij
∣∣∣∣
A
=
∂L∗ij
∂T
[
pjD − ∂dij
∂βij
− ∂Ψij
∂βij
]
. (5)
Substitution of L∗ij into the expected utility function yields the indirect expected
utility function V ∗ij(τ, T, α, βij, dij).
The actual private insurance contracts are endogenous and will depend on the
specific equilibrium concept as illustrated in section 4. At this point, it is only nec-
essary to emphasize that they will depend on the policy P , i.e. βij = βij(τ, T, α) and
dij = dij(τ, T, α). For the purpose of comparative statics w.r.t. the policy parameters,
it will be convenient, however, to express the premium dij as a differentiable function
of the coverage βij, i.e. dij = dij(βij). This is indeed possible for all equilibrium con-
cepts that we will consider later. Functions that account for equilibrium effects are
marked by two asterisks, i.e. L∗∗ij (τ, T, α) = L∗ij(τ, T, α, βij(τ, T, α), dij(βij(τ, T, α))).
Indirect utility V ∗∗ij (τ, T, α) is defined analogously. With this notation and assuming
8It is assumed in this formulation that the premium d can be derived from the coverage β through
a differentiable function, so that ∂dij/∂βij is well-defined. This will be further explained below.
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no exogenous revenue requirement, the government’s optimization problem is
max
T,τ,α
∑
i,j
nij V
∗∗
ij (τ, T, α) s.t.
∑
i,j
nij (τwiL
∗∗
ij − T ) = 0. (6)
Since our focus is on the optimal level of social insurance, we omit a derivation and
discussion of the optimality conditions for the tax parameters in this article, but
confine our attention to the optimality condition for α.9 Assuming an interior solution,
we derive the first order condition for α implied by problem (6) and transform it to
obtain the following Proposition 1. We use two important concepts. The first is the
“net social marginal valuation of an individual’s income”, bij, well-known from the
theory of optimal taxation,
bij =
1
γ
∂V ∗ij
∂T
+ τwi
∂L∗ij
∂T
, (7)
where γ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint, whose
optimal value equals the welfare value of a marginal increase in government revenues.
bij captures the effect of an increased transfer T on the objective via the individual’s
utility and via the effect on the budget constraint through labor supply changes, both
measured in terms of government revenues. In our model, government policy has
additional effects on the objective via the insurance market equilibrium. Therefore,
the concept of “net social marginal valuation of an individual’s insurance”, gij, is
useful:
gij =
1
γ
∂V ∗ij
∂βij
∣∣∣∣
A
+ τwi
∂L∗ij
∂βij
∣∣∣∣
A
. (8)
It captures the effect of a changing equilibrium contract via utility and via the budget
constraint. With this notation, we have
Proposition 1. The optimality condition for the level of social insurance α, assuming
an interior solution, is given by
Cov
(
b,
∂d
∂β
)
= −
∑
i,j
nijgij
(
1 +
∂βij
∂α
)
. (9)
Proof. In the appendix.
Condition (9) generalizes the respective condition that was obtained by Cremer
and Pestieau (1996) for perfect private insurance markets. In this case, it reduces to
9The complete analysis can be found in Netzer and Scheuer (2005), an earlier version of this
paper.
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Cov(b, p) = 0. Social insurance simply crowds out private insurance (∂βij/∂α = −1)
so that the term on the RHS becomes zero. On the other hand, premiums are actu-
arially fair and (9) therefore states that the population covariance between damage
probability and marginal social valuation should be zero. This reflects that social
insurance is a non-distorting means of redistribution. Increasing α redistributes from
low to high risks and lowers the covariance between risk and marginal social valuation.
The government should do this until no correlation remains and the potential of social
insurance for redistribution is exhausted.
Condition (9) becomes an inequality if the optimal α is a corner solution. Indeed,
with perfect markets, the optimal share of social insurance will always be one if high
productivity individuals have lower damage probabilities, i. e. Cov(p, w) < 0, which
is the empirically relevant case.10 With full social insurance, individuals differ only
in their productivity, so that high risk types will still have the higher marginal social
valuation due to their productivity disadvantage. Hence, Cov(b, p) > 0 for all values
of α and full social insurance is optimal. This leads us to the following Corollary of
Proposition 1, which is the result by Cremer and Pestieau (1996):
Corollary 1. If Cov (p, w) < 0 and private insurance markets are perfect, the optimal
social insurance level is α = 1.11
Now consider the general version (9). Suppose first that private insurance premi-
ums are still adjusted actuarially fairly if government policy changes the equilibrium
coverage (∂dij/∂βij = pjD). Even if the correlation between risk and social valu-
ation is positive for all values of α, partial social insurance or even α = 0 can be
optimal if the RHS of (9) is positive. In particular, suppose that social insurance
indeed increases overall coverage for underinsured individuals (∂βij/∂α > −1). The
often discussed efficiency effect of mitigating underinsurance is then present. It is
captured by the first, positive term in gij (see equation (8)): underinsured individu-
als experience an increase in utility if their overall coverage grows and premiums are
adjusted fairly at the margin. However, there is a second, negative term in gij which
captures the precautionary labor effect : individuals will react to the reduction of risk
by reducing labor supply, as shown in Lemma 1. Since this reduces the revenues from
income taxation, it will negatively affect social welfare. When this effect dominates,
the sign of gij is negative and the RHS of (9) becomes positive. The argument for
10See Henriet and Rochet (2004) for some empirical evidence.
11In fact, the government would want to set α > 1 under these circumstances. We do not consider
this possibility due to the moral hazard problems associated with overinsurance.
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social insurance is then weakened by adverse selection compared to situations with
perfect insurance markets.
Finally, the fact that the adjustment of the private premium to changes in cov-
erage matters for the covariance in (9) points at the logic of redistribution via social
insurance. It is not damage probability per se but the possible savings on private pre-
miums that matter for redistribution. While both are the same if markets are perfect,
risk and premium can diverge under adverse selection and substantially change the
redistribution effect of social insurance. If, for example, all individuals pay the same
premium in a pooling contract, the covariance in (9) is zero. In this case, there is no
justification for social insurance from the point of view of redistribution.
4 Imperfect Insurance Markets
While the dependence of the insurance contracts Iij on the policy parameters P has
been left unrestricted so far, we now show how such relations emerge from endogeniz-
ing the insurance market equilibrium. We assume that insurance companies have no
information on individual risks pj but can observe the individual productivity levels
wi. This assumption is to keep our exposition as simple as possible since otherwise we
would have to deal with a problem of two-dimensional adverse selection.12 It allows us
to divide the private insurance market into W sub-markets, one for each productivity
level. Adverse selection in each of those markets can be modeled using a variety of
game theoretic approaches. In the following, we demonstrate how the general opti-
mality condition for social insurance (9) can be applied to the equilibrium concepts
developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977) and Miyazaki (1977).13
4.1 Rothschild-Stiglitz Separating Equilibria
We first consider separating equilibria as suggested by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
in each of the W private insurance markets.14 High risks obtain full coverage at an
individually fair premium, i.e. βiH = 1 − α and diH = pH(1 − α)D. The low risks’
12See Netzer and Scheuer (2006) for an extension of the standard screening model to allow for
two-dimensional heterogeneity. Transferring their results to the present case would take us away
from the main purpose of this paper, however.
13A similar analysis (based on their different timing assumption for labor supply mentioned above)
has been performed by Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau (2006), who only consider
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibria. By applying the results of Proposition 1 to different models of adverse
selection, we try to provide a more general analysis and to identify the robust effects.
14Existence of the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium can actually be guaranteed by applying the
modified equilibrium concept developed by Riley (1979).
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equilibrium contract lies on the low risks’ zero-profit line and is such that the high
risks’ incentive compatibility constraint is just binding.15 Formally, βiL solves
V ∗iH(τ, T, α, 1− α, pH(1− α)D) = V ∗iH(τ, T, α, βiL, pLβiLD). (10)
Clearly, the low risks are underinsured, i.e. βiL < 1− α.
We first derive the net social marginal valuation of insurance, gij, for the different
types. As all individuals pay an actuarially fair premium, the premium-adjusted effect
of a changed equilibrium coverage on labor supply reduces to the pure precautionary
effect
∂L∗ij
∂βij
∣∣∣∣
A
= −∂L
∗
ij
∂T
∂Ψij
∂βij
< 0. (11)
In addition, (11) completely vanishes for the high risks because ∂Ψij/∂βij = 0 at full
insurance. Next, we need to examine
∂V ∗ij
∂βij
∣∣∣∣
A
=
∂V ∗ij
∂βij
− pjD
∂V ∗ij
∂T
.
This is again zero for the high risks, a direct implication of the fact that they ob-
tain their optimal fair contract. The low risks, however, derive positive utility from
an increase in coverage with fair adjustment of the premium. This follows immedi-
ately from risk-aversion and the fact that they are underinsured. Hence we have the
following net social marginal valuation of insurance for the two risks types:
giL =
1
γ
(
∂V ∗iL
∂βiL
− pLD∂V
∗
iL
∂T
)
− τwi∂L
∗
iL
∂T
∂ΨiL
∂βiL
and giH = 0. (12)
It is zero for the high risks as they obtain their first-best contract. For the low-
risk types, the two counteracting welfare effects of variations in insurance coverage
discussed in section 3.2 are present. They benefit from additional coverage at a fair
premium, but at the same time supply less labor due to reduced risk. This reduces
tax revenue and therefore welfare. The overall sign of giL depends notably on the size
of the coefficient of prudence.
To determine the optimal amount of social insurance, we need to know how it
15For this to hold, the single crossing property is required, which implies that the high risks have
the steeper indifference curve in the (βij , dij)-space at any given contract. This is always satisfied
in the standard model with exogenous income. With endogenous labor supply, however, it may
be violated as shown by Netzer and Scheuer (2005). We ignore this potential complication in this
article. Netzer and Scheuer (2005) provide sufficient conditions for the single crossing property to
hold even with endogenous labor supply.
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affects the individuals’ overall coverage. Clearly, as the high risks are always fully
insured, social insurance simply crowds out their private insurance: ∂βiH/∂α = −1.
For the low risks, implicit differentiation of (10) reveals after some simplifications
that ∂βiL/∂α > −1 holds. A marginal increase in social insurance unambiguously
increases their overall coverage. We summarize our results in the following Corollary
of Proposition 1:
Corollary 2. With Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibria on each of the W private insurance
markets, the optimality condition for social insurance is given by
DCov (b, p) = −
∑
i
niLgiL
(
1 +
∂βiL
∂α
)
, (13)
where giL is given by (12) and 1 + ∂βiL/∂α > 0 holds. Even if Cov (p, w) < 0, the
optimal level of α is less than one if households are sufficiently prudent.
Indeed, social insurance redistributes income as in the case of perfect markets and
additionally has positive effects by reducing underinsurance. The negative effect of
reducing labor supply is present as well, however. If households are very prudent,
this alone justifies interior levels of social insurance or even complete renunciation of
a social insurance system.
4.2 Wilson and Miyazaki-Wilson Equilibria
To what extent do the results in the previous subsection depend on the underlying
equilibrium concept? To answer this question, we examine two alternative concepts
in this section, the Wilson pooling equilibrium and the Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium.
We confine ourselves to an intuitive discussion of the results.16
The concept going back to Wilson (1977) allows for the existence of a pooling equi-
librium where both risk types choose the same contract. For each productivity group
i, the Wilson pooling contract is the low risks’ preferred contract on the zero profit line
for the whole group. Hence, there are two fundamental differences to the Rothschild-
Stiglitz separating equilibrium. First, the whole population is underinsured. Second,
no individual pays an individually fair premium, but cross-subsidization from low to
high risks occurs. The most important conclusion follows from this second differ-
ence. Clearly, social insurance is no longer able to redistribute between risks, as this
16For the case of the Wilson pooling equilibrium, the reader is again referred to Netzer and Scheuer
(2005) for the complete analysis. The formal demonstration for the Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium is
available from the authors upon request.
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is already achieved in the market. The only remaining redistributive effect is across
productivity classes if they are characterized by different private insurance premia.
Formally, the covariance in (9) is very small even for α = 0, which considerably
weakens the case for social insurance.
Under the Wilson pooling equilibrium, the effect of α on private coverage is inde-
terminate in general. The empirically relevant case seems to be less than complete
crowding out, however.17 Then, we find that high risks will unambiguously reduce
their labor supply in response to increases in α, since both larger overall coverage and
the more than fair premium affect their labor supply in the same direction. The effect
is in general undetermined for the low risks but also negative if they are sufficiently
prudent. In a reversal of our findings based on the separating equilibria, only the
high risks derive a direct utility gain from increased coverage, while the low risks are
unaffected. These results lead us to the conclusion that both labor distortions and
the lack of redistributive power work in the same direction and may even make the
corner solution α = 0 optimal if precautionary motives are strong.
Finally, we turn to an equilibrium concept that goes back to Wilson (1977) and
Miyazaki (1977).18 It has two interesting properties. First, as shown by Crocker and
Snow (1985), it is always second-best efficient. Second, it is a separating equilibrium
which still involves cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Its analysis is therefore
essentially a careful combination of the results for the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating
and the Wilson pooling equilibria. First, it can be shown that the high risks’ net social
marginal valuation of insurance is zero as in section 4.1 since they obtain full coverage
at a marginally fair premium. Second, low risks’ utility is not directly affected by
a small premium-adjusted increase in insurance coverage. This demonstrates that
social insurance can have no positive efficiency impact in case the market equilibrium
is second-best. Yet, the distortions resulting from precautionary labor still remain
present. Finally, the redistributive impact of social insurance is modified. While it
still redistributes from low to high risks as in the Rothschild-Stiglitz case, the effect
will be smaller here because low risks already subsidize the high risks in the market. In
sum, the fact that no positive efficiency effects but only labor supply distortions arise
and the redistributive power is reduced shows that a lower level of social insurance
compared to a situation with (first best) efficient private insurance markets will again
be optimal if precautionary motives are sufficiently strong.
17See, for instance, Cutler and Gruber (1996).
18It is often also associated with Spence (1978).
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5 Conclusion
We have developed a theory of optimal taxation and social insurance in the presence of
imperfect private insurance markets. While the problem of taxation requires to model
the households’ choice of labor supply endogenously, inefficient insurance markets
imply that they have to take this decision under risk. Hence, a theory of labor supply
under uncertainty provides the basis for our analysis. As we have shown, there exists
a motive for precautionary labor under general and meaningful circumstances.
The integration of imperfect insurance markets into a model of taxation and social
insurance allowed us to show how the optimality conditions for public policy based
on efficient insurance markets have to be modified. Notably, the strength of the
precautionary labor motive turns out to be crucial in determining whether social
insurance should be higher or lower compared to earlier results. Social insurance
might have efficiency-enhancing effects by reducing underinsurance. At the same time,
larger overall insurance coverage leads individuals to reduce their labor supply, which
emerges as an important repercussion. Furthermore, social insurance suffers from
substantially reduced redistributive power when equilibria with cross-subsidization
prevail on markets. Finally, even the positive efficiency effects vanish in a second-best
market equilibrium. Using specific equilibrium concepts for the insurance markets,
we illustrated these results and showed that it may even be optimal to completely
renounce on social insurance as a policy device and only use income taxation to achieve
redistributive objectives. This is in stark contrast to conjectures of the previous
literature where social insurance provided a means of distortion-free redistribution.
Our paper has raised issues for further research. Our theory of precautionary la-
bor may provide an important and so far unexplored tool for analyzing a variety of
other economic problems such as optimal labor contracts, unemployment and macroe-
conomic fluctuations. In addition, the interaction between precautionary labor and
precautionary savings might lead to new and interesting effects in dynamic models
that account for the interaction of labor, insurance, and capital markets.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider a damageD that occurs with probability p, and of which a share β is insured.
This defines a Bernoulli random variable with expectation p (1 − β)D and variance
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p (1− p)[(1− β)D]2. The first order condition for optimal labor supply L∗(β) is
w[p u′(wL∗ + T − (1− β)D) + (1− p)u′(wL∗ + T )] = −v′(L∗). (14)
The income effect can be derived by implicitly differentiating (14):
∂L∗
∂T
= −w [pu
′′(wL∗ + T − (1− β)D) + (1− p)u′′(wL∗ + T )]
SOC
, (15)
where SOC stands for the second derivative of the objective with respect to L and
is negative. Therefore, the income effect is negative, which implies that leisure is a
normal good.
Implicit differentiation of (14) w.r.t. β yields after some rearrangements
∂L∗
∂β
=
∂L∗
∂T
pD − w[u
′′(wL∗ + T − (1− β)D)− u′′(wL∗ + T )]
SOC
p(1− p)D. (16)
The income effect due to decreased expected damage is already visible as the first term
on the RHS of (16). Substituting ∆u′′(β) for u′′(wL∗+T )−u′′(wL∗+T − (1−β)D),
E[u′′(.)] for p u′′(wL∗+T − (1−β)D)+(1−p) u′′(wL∗+T ), together with the income
effect (15) and the first derivative of the variance w.r.t to β, the effect (16) can be
transformed to
∂L∗
∂β
=
∂L∗
∂T
[
pD − ∂Ψ
∂β
]
, (17)
where
∂Ψ
∂β
=
(
−∆u
′′(β)/(1− β)D
E[u′′(.)]
)(
1
2
∂Var
∂β
)
. (18)
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition for the optimal level of social
insurance α given by problem (6) is
∑
i,j
nij
∂V ∗∗ij
∂α
+ γ
∑
i,j
nij τwi
∂L∗∗ij
∂α
= 0. (19)
The effect of α on L∗∗ij can be reduced to effects on L∗ij by explicitly taking into account
its effect on the private insurance market equilibrium:
∂L∗∗ij
∂α
=
∂L∗ij
∂α
+
∂L∗ij
∂βij
∣∣∣∣
A
∂βij
∂α
. (20)
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The same decomposition can be applied to V ∗∗ij . After some rearrangements, one
obtains ∑
i,j
nij
(
1
γ
∂V ∗ij
∂α
+ τwi
∂L∗ij
∂α
)
+
∑
i,j
nijgij
∂βij
∂α
= 0. (21)
The first term on the LHS of (21) can further be transformed by noting that effects
of α on labor supply can be expressed as effects of βij as follows:
∂L∗ij
∂α
=
∂L∗ij
∂βij
∣∣∣∣
A
+ (d′ij − p¯D)
∂L∗ij
∂T
, (22)
where d′ij stands short for ∂dij/∂βij. Equation (22) follows from the fact the changes
in social and private insurance differ only with respect to their different premiums.
The same decomposition holds for indirect utility. Substituting this into (21) yields
∑
i,j
nijgij
(
1 +
∂βij
∂α
)
+
∑
i,j
nijbij(d
′
ij − p¯D) = 0. (23)
After adding and subtracting
∑
i,j nij b¯(d
′
ij − p¯D) one obtains
∑
i,j
nijgij
(
1 +
∂βij
∂α
)
+
∑
i,j
nij(bij − b¯)(d′ij − p¯D) + b¯
∑
i,j
nij(d
′
ij − p¯D) = 0. (24)
The last term on the LHS of (24) is equal to zero since aggregate profits of insurance
companies in a competitive market equilibrium are zero. Therefore, higher insurance
coverage for all individuals will be accompanied by adjustments in the premiums
such that additional revenues equal additional expected insurance payments on the
population average.
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